




### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 November 1962

MEMCRANDUM FCR: Members of the Rostow Advance Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Council

The attached memoranium has been prepared by CLA in response to Planning Task A of the Advance Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Council.





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8 November 1962

MEMCRAHILUM

SUBJECT: Possible Sowiet Military Reactions to the Cuben

Cutcome: Gimicks and Programs


l. In putting strategic missiles into Cuba, the USSA clearly was seeking a unjor political accomplishment. But the venture, and the risks which were accepted, suggest that in addition the Soviets may have been seeking a way to improve the strategic relationship between themselves and the US. While they probably attribute their failure primarily to US local advantage in the Caribban they also believe that its strategic superiority bolstered US confidence in responding to the local challenge. At any rate, the outcome certainly has not reduced their desire to find some way, in real terms, to counter or offset US long-range striking power. And their desire to do this in apparent terms has doubtless grown, since the course of the crisis has led many in the world to wonder whether the USSA backed down because of strategic weakness.



2. There are some measures, based on existing programs, which could be taken fairly quickly and inexpensively to help rebuild the world image of Soviet strategic night. These measures, however, are unlikely to have much effect on US government celculations of relative strength. Changing the real balance is much barder. Programs of this sort would necessarily be costly; they cannot all be pursued simultaneously; any substantial increase in the present array of programs will injure non-military objectives; the USSR would have to expect the US to obtain enough knowledge of new efforts to begin countermeasures before they are completed. Furthermore, only limited measures can be taken quickly. It would be virtually impossible, for example, for the USSR to acquire within the next year any significant new ICEM or missile submarine capability over that presently planned.

### Demonstrations in the Next Year Or So

3. A number of military and space accomplishments are now within Soviet capabilities, and some demonstrative feats were probably scheduled well before the Cuban crisis. None of these represents a radical advance, and none is likely to change the world opinion about relative US-USSR strength. Some have important political drawbacks. Nevertheless, the Soviets may believe that



continuing accomplishments of this sort would help to restore the power image turnished in the showdown over Cuba.

- 4. Stace Feats. A series of space accomplishments during the next year was certainly programed before the Cuban crisis, but the USSR might try to accelerate its earlier schedule in hopes of off-setting the impression of inferiority left by the cutcome. In 1962-63, the following individual space missions will probably be within Soviet capabilities, although it is unlikely that they can all be accomplished during this period: multi-manned satellite; rendezvous and possible docking of two satellites; a ten-day manned satellite; unmanned circumlumar flight; unmanned satellite placed in lumar orbit; soft lumar landings of instrumented packages; planetary probes.
- 5. Very High-yield Weapons. The USSR can at any time detonate a nuclear weapon yielding over 100 MT and expect Western verification. Soviet spokesmen could go on to imply that many or all Soviet long-range missiles are equipped with this warhead. Such a demonstration would conflict to some extent with Soviet protestations of peacefulness and concern for disarrament. Moreover, it would not be a radical advance on previous demonstrations and claims. The Soviets might therefore choose to demonstrate

simultaneously a delivery capability for a very high yield warhead. They could probably do this now, using an existing ICEM to launch and detonate a 100 MT meanon over Morsya Zemlya. Or they might choose to detonate a missile-delivered lower yield weapon (around 25 MT) over the Pacific.

- 6. Anti-Satellite Carability. There is some chance that the USSR now has a capability to shoot down an earth satellite, either its own or a US one, and this chance will grow in the coming year. The Soviets would probably believe that such a demonstration would increase general respect for their power and fear of their determination. On the other hand, they would take on themselves the onus for making the first military use of space and, if they considered bringing down a US vehicle, they would have to concern themselves about possible US reprisals against Soviet vehicles or other countermeasures.
- 7. Orbital Ecropardment Capability. The USSR can at any time claim that a newly launched earth satellite is carrying a nuclear weapon, arguing that US acrossiveness must be curbed by such special means. The US could not make a convincing denial, and the USSR would probably expect to win some credibility for

its claim. Again, it would incur some general blame and might provoke US counteraction.

- 8. Global Rocket. The USSR probably is capable new of substantiating its claims to a "global rocket" which avoids EMEWS detection by firing a missile (with a reduced paylond) on a southerly trajectory to impact in the southern or western Pacific. A prior announcement establishing an impact area would increase the credibility of the demonstration. The effect of this demonstration could be increased if instead of using a ballistic trajectory, the vehicle was fired into orbit and then brought down in the announced impact area.
- 9. Anti-Missile Demonstration. The USSR is in a position to stage a demonstration in which an anti-missile intercepts and destroys an incoming ballistic missile. This sort of accomplishment might commend itself to the Soviet lenders as a manual of switching attention from strategic striking power to strategic defense capabilities, where the USSR has a better chance to make credible claims of superiority. Photographs, films, news stories, and leadership statements could be used to sustain claims in this field, but the chances of impressing world opinion would be greatly improved by an actual achievement generally accepted as



valid. This might be an interception over Sary Shagan or possibly Kamehatka, accompanied by as much publicity as was consistent with security requirements.

# Real Improvements in the Near Term

10. Soviet strategic capabilities are of course constantly being strengthened, but a number of incediate measures are available to improve the USSR's present military posture. These include putting more submarines on station within striking distance of the US, dispersing mobile MREMS, and establishing a higher level of alert and dispersal for the Long Range Air Force. The USSR probably believes that these moves, all of which could have been made at any time in the recent past, would come to the attention of the US government, which would then conclude that it faced a greater strategic threat, but not one which gave the USSR a clear strategic advantage. Measures of this sort would not reach the world public.

## Real Improvements in the Long Run

11. Existing National Intelligence Estimates project a continuing improvement in Soviet long-range striking forces and air defenses over the next several years. In the offensive field,



intelligence estimates a steady buildup in numbers of ICEMs and missile-launching submarines, although the numerical increase estimated in delivery vehicles is not so steep as that programmed for US forces. In addition, survivability will improve as missile sites are hardened and the submarine fleet becomes larger, while the warheads yield capabilities for all

Systems will increase.

12. In any reconsideration of defense programs, we think it very unlikely that the USSR will abandon the concept of balanced forces in an effort to maximize one particular kind of capability, say long-range attack. The Soviet military leadership places a high value upon theater forces and has already succeeded in undoing Khrushchev's plan launched in 1960, to reduce them. With respect to air defense, the traditional Soviet concern with defense and the great scale of the USSR's anti-missile efforts to date persuade us that this program will not be abandoned or drastically cut back to provide resources for competing programs.

Thus while some savings might be effected in various areas, we think that any major upward revisions in individual programs could only be accomplished through roughly equivalent increases in total military spending.

13. The question of the Soviet long run military reaction to the Cuban affair may be posed in terms of whether the Soviet Union will continue to concentrate on dominating Europe and the European periphery with strategic weapons and large ground forces, with their intercontinental weapons systems limited to some sort of minimum deterrent level, or will initiate a basic change in its strategy and attempt to achieve parity or even superiority in weapons systems for intercontinental thermonuclear war. We can also lock for some intermediate alternative.

14. One plausible option would be to continue what appears to be the current strategy with such modifications as hardening a larger portion of the ICEM force, possible some upward revision of the force level, and AEM deployment for a number of the larger urban areas -- say 20 to 25 -- together with the maintenance and continued modernization of the ground and associated mayal and air forces at about present levels. Military space systems might be limited to modest recommaissance and early warning forces.

- 15. A second option, at the other extreme, would be to enter into an ICHM race with the US with the object of achieving parity or marked superiority in the number of launchers operational and in the yield and accuracy of the system. A large submarine-launched long-range ballistic massile force would likely be part of this option. This ICHM force would be supported by extensive deployment of recommissance and early warning space systems. Carried to its logical extremes, this option would also include large-scale AFM deployment, say 25 to 30 urban areas as a minimal, and maintenance of ground and movel forces at something like the present levels.
- 16. Under either option, limited proital bechardment and other offensive space systems might be added to supplement the other forces and to maximize the political effect of Soviet will-tary posture
- 17. If the Soviet leaders seek an option falling between these extremes we believe that it will emphasize diversity, seek to create an image of technical superiority, and to maximize the political effects which are offered by very large weapons and by



as far as heavy industry is concerned, would be relatively good.

The middle option would continue the strain somewhat longer but would be more consistent with Khrushchev's competitive openistence strategy. The all out arms race option would emcerbate present military burden, continue the strain for 5 to 10 years, continue to allow the rate of growth by limiting the investment program, and did the prospects of catching up with the US in this century. It would also draw heavily on the resources required for the Soviet space program, perhaps making it impossible for the USSR to compete with the US in a manned lumar landing and other missions.





20. Soviet subminise-invacied ballistic missile systems saitable for attacking the US currently are considerably more expensive than an ICIM force with comparable capability, but progress in developing a subminise/missile weapon system with a larger missile load per subminine would probably reduce the disparity. We believe that orbital bandardment systems will be significantly more expensive than ICIM systems. The relative cost of large payload ICIMs is difficult to estimate